Kasserine Pass: A Myth of Military Disaster

Triumph Amidst Adversity in America's First Battle Against the Wehrmacht

Postmortem analyses often portray the damage inflicted on the United States Army by the Wehrmacht during the Battle of Kasserine Pass from February 18-24, 1943, in dramatic, nearly catastrophic terms. The New York Times bestselling author Thomas Ricks wrote that the battle was “the worst defeat of American Ground Forces in Europe or Africa during World War II.”¹ Another journalist described it as the “most humiliating U.S. combat setback in World War II.”² Commemorative articles in The National Interest described the battle as “America’s Most Humiliating Defeat,” while Business Insider asserted that the U.S. Army was “soundly defeated.”³ Another historian concluded the battle was a “disaster.”⁴ The current nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Elbridge Colby claimed Kasserine was an apparent “U.S. defeat” in the broader context of Erwin Rommel’s enduring reputation as one of the war’s great generals.⁵ Martin Blumenson, who authored the official U.S. Army history of the battle as well as the most widely read book on the subject, also characterized the battle as a clear defeat.⁶

This article explores those characterizations, and while the Battle of Kasserine Pass is often remembered as a humiliating defeat for the U.S. Army, this perspective oversimplifies a far more complex and dynamic engagement. The battle, part of the larger Tunisia Campaign, exposed flaws in American leadership, coordination, and combat experience, but it also showcased the resilience, adaptability, and sheer firepower that would define the U.S. military in later battles. Although initial German advances created chaos and forced American forces to retreat, the tide soon turned as U.S. artillery and infantry stiffened their resistance, ultimately repelling the Axis offensive. The battle was not a catastrophic failure but rather a painful learning experience—one that forced the U.S. Army to rapidly evolve into the battle-hardened force that would go on to liberate Europe.

The upcoming battle was part of the larger Tunisia Campaign, which began in November 1942 when the Allies launched Operation Torch, an amphibious invasion of North Africa. The goal was to clear Axis forces from the region and gain control of key ports and airfields. The operation was successful, but there were worrying signs, especially considering the inexperience, lack of aggressiveness, and tactical shortcomings. Prior to the Tunisia Campaign, the Axis forces, commanded by General Erwin Rommel, the famous and feared “Desert Fox” had been defeated at the Battle of El Alamein in Egypt in late 1942. This defeat marked a turning point in the North African campaign, leading to an Axis retreat westward.

Axis forces regrouped in Tunisia and received reinforcements. Meanwhile, the Allies advanced from the west, aiming to link up with the British 8th Army coming from the east. This set the stage for a confrontation in Tunisia. The Allies faced challenges in coordinating their forces across the continent, as different national contingents had varying levels of experience and were led by commanders with differing strategies and philosophies. There were also issues of communication and cooperation among the Allied leadership.

The German leadership knew time was running out—every hour wasted allowed the Allies to reinforce with more troops, supplies, and vehicles. Rommel saw the American Army as the weak link and launched a surprise attack to prevent the Allies from coordinating a unified offensive. While Axis forces initially held numerical superiority in the theater, that advantage was fleeting. Rommel opted to push through Kasserine Pass toward the U.S. II Corps at Tébessa, aiming to seize American supplies beyond the mountains, disrupt the Allies' ability to strike the vital Mareth-Tunis corridor and threaten the southern flank of the British 1st Army. It was classic German warfare—a swift, decisive strike designed to achieve multiple objectives in one bold move.

If anything came close to being a disaster for the U.S. Army, it was the days leading up to Kasserine Pass. The U.S. defense throughout the sector was fragmented, with units spread out and operating separately within task forces or regimental combat teams rather than fighting in a unified order of battle. The German Offensive kicked off on Valentine’s Day, February 14, 1943. The 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions quickly smashed through a motley crew of units, including the 168th Infantry, which was surrounded and almost entirely destroyed. Elements of the 1st Armored Division launched a “charge of the light brigade” style attack to rescue the situation, but failure to coordinate the attack and superior anti-tank guns resulted in an abnormal number of vehicle losses, prisoners, and casualties. For example, C Company of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion, with 12 tanks in all launched themselves at the Panzers and were quickly destroyed.⁷ In the only fashion they knew, the Wehrmacht raced for Kasserine Pass.

A mixed force defended the pass, including the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, the 19th Combat Engineer Regiment, the 6th Field Artillery Battalion, a tank destroyer battalion, and a battery of French artillery nominally named Task Force Stark. General Lloyd Fredendall, commander of the U.S. II Corps, had identified this as a key piece of the defense, and the combat engineers had only recently arrived. In the early hours of February 19, Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps Assault Group to advance from Feriana and attack the Kasserine Pass. Meanwhile, the 21st Panzer Division, positioned at Sbeitla, was directed to push northward through the pass east of Kasserine, leading toward Sbiba and Ksour. Additionally, Kampfgruppe von Broich, a battlegroup from the 10th Panzer Division released by Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, commander of the 5th Panzer Army, was instructed to concentrate at Sbeitla, poised to exploit any breakthrough in either pass.

However, the initial German attacks ran into heavy artillery fire and stubborn resistance, forcing Rommel to commit reserves well before he intended. The Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Rick Atkinson observed, “The Americans were crumbling but stubbornly refused to collapse.” It was only the next day that a frontal attack by the Italian 5th Bersaglieri Regiment ripped a seam in the American defense, forcing elements on the left and right to withdraw (which they did in relatively good order). It was during the withdrawal that a setback turned into defeat.

After breaking through the pass, the Axis forces split off into three different directions, attacking Djebel el Hamra, Thala, and Sbibia, all key towns on the road to Tébessa, where Fredendall’s Headquarters and huge Allied supply depots were located. This was a puzzling strategy. “Even a commander usually dubbed a genius suddenly looks much more mortal when moving in three directions at once,” the historian Robert Citino observed of Rommel’s decision.⁸ Fredendall had no grasp of the situation and even ordered the supply depots and his headquarters (nicknamed Speedy Valley), a vast bunker blasted out of the ground, to be prepared for demolition.⁹

Even for the apparent panic in the rear, there was no panic among the Americans (and British) preparing to renew the battle against their foe. In fact, there was a cocky swagger; a commander from Charlie Company, 1st Rangers, the new elite of the U.S. Army sent to reinforce the 1st Infantry, told his men, “If the tanks come, may God help the tanks.”¹⁰ The Panzers were indeed coming, racing to Djebel el Hamra, the following key town in their path. Here, they would run into the U.S. 16th Infantry Regiment of the “Big Red One” and Combat Command B of the U.S. 1st Armored Division. With little direction from Fredendall, General Terry De la Mesa, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, took command of the situation himself. An officer in the “Big Red One” declared, “If they attack us in force, we cannot hold, but by God we will.”¹¹

The German–Italian force did attack in force, but they were immediately halted, failing to dislodge the American defenders. The next day, plans made by both sides were upset by battle, and the Axis forces (5th Bersaglieri, a Semovente group from Centauro and 15th Panzer Division) launched yet another assault on the U.S. position on the morning of February 22 toward Bou Chebka Pass. Although the American defenders were pushed to the breaking point, they held. By mid-afternoon, in what would become a recurring theme throughout the war, American artillery was so devastating that it made further advances by German and Italian forces impossible. The 16th Infantry’s quartermaster company kept the front lines stocked with a steady stream of ammunition and supplies, with its 30 trucks racking up 50,000 miles over the course of the battle.¹² Under the cover of relentless artillery fire, U.S. infantry and tanks launched a counterattack at 3:30, shattering the combined German and Italian forces, forcing them into a retreat while also capturing 400 prisoners.¹³

Meanwhile, heavy fighting was taking place North of Djecbee el Hamra at Thala where the 26th British Armored Brigade and remnants of the U.S. 26th Infantry Regiment of the 1st ID had dug in on ridges. Colonel Gerald Kelleher, commander of the 1st Battalion, had been captured but managed to escape and return to command, rallying stragglers who had also evaded or escaped capture.¹⁴ On February 21, under heavy German assault, the combined force carried out one of the most challenging maneuvers in combat—a fighting withdrawal. Ridge by ridge, they fought, calling in artillery when under heavy pressure before falling back to the next position. When one battery hesitated to fire because they realized they would basically be firing on the American position, the officer calling in the fire mission radioed back, “Don’t mind me, blast these fuckers around me.”¹⁵ This continued throughout the day until nightfall. Though they had taken casualties, the force held its ground. Just in time, the 9th Infantry Division's artillery train—comprising 48 artillery pieces and additional anti-tank weapons—arrived after an astonishing 800-mile journey Oran completed in just four days.¹⁶

The following day, as the Axis assault resumed, American artillery unleashed such a relentless barrage that Wehrmacht veterans from the Eastern Front later lamented they had run into “a wall of fire,” surpassing anything they had encountered in Russia or Africa up to that point.¹⁷ The 27th Field Artillery Regiment, consisting of just 18 guns, lobbed 2000 rounds in less than five hours.¹⁸ The 33rd Field Artillery Regiment contributed another 800 rounds to the “wall of fire.”¹⁹ The prowess of American artillery during the battle can be attributed to Stafford Irwin of the 9th Infantry Division and Cliff Andrus of the 1st Infantry Division, who commanded the artillery of the respective divisions.²⁰ Under constant fire, the 10th Panzer Division waited until dark to retire from the battlefield.

The final chapter of the Kasserine Pass battle unfolded at Sbiba, where the 18th Infantry, 133rd Infantry, 134th Infantry, and British armored units had fortified their positions. As with previous assaults, the 21st Panzer Division found itself halted in its tracks, overwhelmed by a relentless artillery barrage from the 151st Artillery Battalion. It was an artillerist’s dream—Axis forces were exposed on the valley floor, with no cover, while forward observers called in devastatingly precise fire, turning the battlefield into a killing ground.

At this point, overstretched and running out of supplies, Rommel issued orders that evening of the 22nd, calling off any additional attacks and directing all Axis units to return to their starting positions. Beyond the inflicted casualties and captured supplies, all Rommel did was simply delay the inevitable. By the end of his offensive, he launched three different attacks and suffered three separate defeats losing tanks and men that he could not afford to lose. By February 23, the last of the German and Italian forces were skulking out of Kasserine Pass, never to return again.

U.S. Artillery won the battles

The Battle of Kasserine Pass has long been labeled a military catastrophe, an overwhelming disaster, or a crushing blow—but why this perception persists remains unclear. Perhaps exaggerations simply became ingrained in later discussions, as even one of General Eisenhower’s aides remarked immediately after that Kasserine was “one of the greatest defeats in our history.”²¹ The presence of Erwin Rommel, the most well-known German general in the West, executing yet another swift “blitzkrieg” assault, may have contributed to the narrative. The disparity in casualties is another factor. The Americans suffered nearly 6,000 casualties and lost 183 tanks, 104 half-tracks, 208 artillery pieces, and 512 trucks and jeeps, along with large quantities of supplies.²² Yet, in the context of American industrial might, those losses were a drop in the bucket—especially considering that in 1943 alone, U.S. factories produced 19,000 halftracks, 37,198 tanks, 221,000 Artillery pieces, and 640,000 trucks and jeeps. By contrast, Axis losses—approximately 20 tanks, 67 vehicles, 14 guns, and around 1,500 men—may seem modest, but these were elite German troops in Africa, losses they could ill afford.²³

In addition, the battle itself was a dramatic and chaotic spectacle—hysteria at headquarters, futile armored charges into the teeth of German guns, and green U.S. troops paraded through the streets as prisoners of war. Such intense moments naturally lend themselves to equally charged rhetoric in historical analysis. Furthermore, throughout history, military accounts have often exaggerated battlefield losses and setbacks, likely for dramatic effect, shaping perceptions far beyond the actual events. Some American units, such as the 186th Infantry, several battalions of the 1st Armored Division, and Task Force Stark, certainly struggled in battle. However, labeling their performance as "humiliating" or a "disaster" oversimplifies the complexities of combat and ignores the broader context of how well the U.S. Army fought. For example, General Ernest Harmon, who would briefly command II Corps during the battle, stated in his autobiography written decades later, “The First Armored Division was not so much beaten as it was misused.”²⁴ Ultimately, while the Battle of Kasserine Pass exposed flaws in leadership and strategy, it also demonstrated the resilience, adaptability, and fighting spirit of the American soldier—qualities that would soon turn the tide of war in the Allies’ favor.

American troops taken prisoner at Kasserine Pass marching through a Tunisian village

Kasserine Pass wasn’t the embarrassing rout history often remembers—it was the fiery trial that forged an army ready to take the fight to the Axis and win. Rommel himself later wrote, “the Americans had fought brilliantly.”²⁵ Other German generals left the battle impressed by the resilience and adaptability of their foe. Sure, the "Amerikaners" were green and inexperienced, but what did that matter when they had to march through a relentless barrage of high-explosive fire just to reach them? And even when they did get close enough to fight them, the Americans stood their ground and fought—often to the last man. The Historian Robert Citino observed of the battle,

The encounter showed more than anything a U.S. Army finally pulling itself together, assembling a package that included solid field-grade leadership (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels), vast material resources, and an immense level of firepower.²⁶

Another historian noted that after Kasserine, there was a “broad realization that even an adversary as formidable as Erwin Rommel was neither invincible nor infallible. He and their host could be beaten.”²⁷

The performance of Lloyd Fredendall was poor, and he was promptly dismissed, paving the war for generals like Omar Bradley and George Patton to earn their stripes. But the performance of every other officer was impressive. When they were called to march to the sound of the guns, they ran. “There is nothing wrong with the common American soldier. His fighting spirit is good. His morale is okay. The deeper he gets into a fight, the more of a fighting man he becomes,” wrote Ernie Pyle, the most famous American journalist of the war. ²⁸ Nearly every unit that fought at Kasserine—including the 1st Infantry, 34th Infantry, 1st Armored, and 9th Infantry Divisions—was rebuilt and went on to play a key role in the final Tunisia campaign, which led to the expulsion of Axis forces from the continent and the capture of nearly 267,000 German and Italian soldiers—80 times the number of Americans captured at Kasserine. At worst, the battle was a tactical setback; at best, it was a strategic victory. Either way, it was far from the crushing defeat or disaster it is often portrayed to be.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass was not the humiliating disaster that many have made it out to be. While it exposed weaknesses in American leadership, coordination, and combat experience, it also served as a vital learning experience—one that the U.S. Army rapidly absorbed and applied. In the grander scheme of the war, Kasserine was less a decisive defeat and more a hard lesson that transformed the American military into a battle-hardened force capable of taking on the best the Axis had to offer. The same divisions that struggled in Tunisia would later storm the beaches of Normandy, push through the hedgerows of France, and ultimately march into Germany itself. If Kasserine Pass was a test, then the U.S. Army passed—not in the moment, but in what came after.

References

Atkinson, Rick. 2002. An Army at Dawn. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Blumenson, Martin. 1986. "Kasserine Pass Battles." In America's First Battle, 1776-1965, by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, 226-265. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Citino, Robert. 2012. The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War 1943. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

First Division Museum. First Division Museum Digital Archive. Wheaton IL, declassified in 1962. https://firstdivisionmuseum.nmtvault.com/jsp/PsImageViewer.jsp.

Harmon, Ernest. 1970. Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Ricks, Thomas E. 2012. The Generals: American Military Command From World War II to Today. New York, Penguin Press.

Stewart, Richard W. “The ‘Red Bull’ Division: The Training and Initial Engagements of the 34th Infantry Division, 1941-43.” Army History, no. 25 (1993): 1–10.

1. Thomas E. Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command From World War II to Today (New York, Penguin Press, 2012), 53.

2. Patrick Kiger, “How Gen. Eisenhower Spun a Humiliating WWII Defeat into Winning Military Strategy.” History Channel, February 15, 2019.

3. Michael Peck, “Kasserine Pass: America’s Most Humiliating Defeat of World War II.” The National Interest, February 25, 2017. Benjamin Brimelow, “What the US's first humiliating encounter with the Nazis taught the Allies about how to win World War II.” Business Insider, February 22, 2022.

4. Stewart, Richard W. “The ‘Red Bull’ Division: The Training and Initial Engagements of the 34th Infantry Division, 1941-43.” Army History, no. 25 (1993): 1.

5. Tweet.

6. Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass: An Epic Saga of Desert War (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1966)

7. Robert Citino The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War 1943 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 93.

8. Citino, 95.

9. Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 374-375.

10. Atkinson, 380.

11. Atkinson, 371.

12. 1st Quartermaster Battalion, 301-QM-0.3: Reports of Operations, 8 Nov 42 – 14 Apr 43, 12. All after-action reports and primary sources come from the First Division Museum (Wheaton IL, declassified in 1962)

13. 301-0.3: Summary of Operations, 8 Nov 1942 – 9 Mar 1943, 6.

14. 301-INF(26)-1.2: G-1 Journal and File, Jan – Feb 1943, 27.

15. 301-INF(26)-0.15: Press Clippings, 1943, 20.

16. Atkinson, 376.

17. Citino, 95.

18. Atkinson, 381.

19. 301-FA(33)-0.3: Reports of Operations, 8 Nov 42 – 11 May 43, 13.

20. Citino, 96.

21. Citino, 96.

22. Martin Blumenson, 1986. "Kasserine Pass Battles." In America's First Battles, 1776-1965, by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, 226-265. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 261.

23. Citino, 97.

24. Ernest Harmon, Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 146

25. Blumenson, 260.

26. Citino, 96.

27. Atkinson, 392.

28. Quoted from Atkinson, 366.