On the diplomatic side as a State Department officer I remember hearing that the lesson of the bombing campaign was that ‘if you want to send a message, use a telegram”. There was also the clear demonstration year in and year out that Hanoi understood that, like the French the Americans would eventually go home but the Vietnamese would still be there. In the pre-precision guided weapons era of Desert Storm the bombing campaign seriously undermined the strategic bombing mavens while the downed air crew in captivity offered Hanoi more bargaining chips.
Thanks for the well-researched and interesting article, I was especially interested to learn about Ball and Clifford's objections. The use of airpower in smaller wars is important to study.
On the diplomatic side as a State Department officer I remember hearing that the lesson of the bombing campaign was that ‘if you want to send a message, use a telegram”. There was also the clear demonstration year in and year out that Hanoi understood that, like the French the Americans would eventually go home but the Vietnamese would still be there. In the pre-precision guided weapons era of Desert Storm the bombing campaign seriously undermined the strategic bombing mavens while the downed air crew in captivity offered Hanoi more bargaining chips.
Thanks for the well-researched and interesting article, I was especially interested to learn about Ball and Clifford's objections. The use of airpower in smaller wars is important to study.