16 Comments

Good article. As you allude to with the anecdote from the First World War, another issue is that infanteering is a specialism in its own right; while all soldiers learn the basics, you can't carry out proper infantry tasks without people specifically trained in detail to undertake them.

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Absolutely agree. Infantry 'all arms training' does not produce specialist infanteres, a very important point.

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That’s a really great post, top to bottom. Especially the commentary on modern analysts focusing on disruptive innovations that cause us to lose track of fundamentals…keep ‘em coming

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Thank you, appreciate it!

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Thoroughly enjoyed this article. A problem that needs to be solved and I totally agree that for all its innovative new tech, the Ukraine War clearly demonstrates that infantry are required as much today as they ever were.

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The individual replacement concept believed that new men integrated with experienced men would be the best way to go. This is not the best solution. Units that train together and stay together and are then introduced to combat perform better. On the individual level and small unit level infantry combat is exceedingly complex. It requires continual coordination, tenacity, physical fitness, trust and mental and emotional resilience. That is not found in the average man and requires considerable screening and training to achieve. Ultimately, the enemy has a say as well. Liddell Hart best describes the characteristics of the best infantrymen and their leaders.

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Thanks for the comment. I think every major study of the WWII system concluded it was flawed and probably shouldn’t have been used. Unfortunately, the U.S. army had the absolute minimum number of infantry divisions required with the belief that any more would takes away from the wartime economy. Also in WWII, the infantry usually got the low quality recruits compared to the other services. I couldn’t integrate it into my research but the Marines had ample rest periods between operations thus giving them time to integrate replacements and usually had a better performance as a result.

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You are correct. The USMC and the Wehrmacht, until the middle of the war, used unit replacement. The Army and Marine Corps both used individual replacements in Vietnam to their great sorrow. Should never be done again. Ukraine should learn.

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Well written. If anything, recent developments have been infantry enhancing and made them more important.

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Yes I agree, thanks for the comment and be sure to subscribe!

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I think the answer to the central question is that being in the infantry is terrible (based on the casualty rates in your article).

The common social solution is to attach high social prestige to high risk positions, but social prestige is in part driven by relative scarcity.

To use a modern analogy, everyone is impressed by a Navy Seal or Green Beret, but most people aren’t particularly impressed by an army infantryman (no more so then the base rate of social prestige being in the military).

This combines to create an adverse selection bias. If you end up in the infantry, the assumption is you couldn’t have gotten anything better, which further degrades perceptions of social prestige. This gets accentuated in knowledge based economies.

Thank you for a thoughtful and well researched article.

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Thanks for the comment, those are all good points, be sure to subscribe!

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Great piece! Subscribed!

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Excellent article. Thanks for the read.

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Thanks for the comment!

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Great article, but perhaps is important thinks about demografics and the future of a population if chosse send very young people to the grinder

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