The Cult of Sicario

GOP Rhetoric, Aimless Political Violence, and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Relations

The Delta Force team moves quietly through the gully, their night vision and thermal goggles scanning the terrain ahead. A faint outline emerges—a suspected cartel tunnel leading toward the United States. They halt.

“What are the rules of engagement?” the Delta Force team leader whispers.

“Weapons free, my friend. Weapons free,” replies the CIA Special Activities Division officer.

The order is relayed down the line: “Weapons free, boys.”

The team advances, shadows in the night until the firefight erupts. Gunmen are swiftly neutralized with precision. Amid the chaos, an operative slips through the tunnel, continuing the next phase of the mission unseen. Within moments, the gunfire ceases, and the Delta team vanishes as if they were never there.

“That,” the CIA officer says, shaking the hand of the Delta Team leader, “was a clean, clean fucking op, my friend.” The team nods, already blending back into the night, leaving no trace of their deadly efficiency.

(Note: This paper was a companion to a presentation I delivered a few years ago in a graduate school course titled “North American Security” taught by members of NORTHCOM. In light of Mexico’s recent position paper filed at the U.N. and increasing rhetoric around the use of American military force in Mexico, I decided to update, edit, and publish it)

Denis Villeneuve’s film Sicario, though critically acclaimed and receiving three Academy Award nominations for Best Cinematography, Best Original Score, and Best Sound Editing, was initially unheralded upon its 2015 release, only making $85 million at the box office. Over time, however, it has been adopted by some within the Republican Party as a dramatic vision for addressing cartel violence, with increasing rhetoric around the use of unilateral military force against the cartels in Mexico. It was the fall of 2021, and I was new to Washington, D.C., eager to connect with people and attend the quintessential house party in the Capitol Hill neighborhood. Amid the mingling, I struck up a conversation with a GOP staffer working for a member of the Foreign Affairs committee. Naturally, as often happens at D.C. gatherings, the topic turned to foreign policy. When the issue of drug cartels came up, he bluntly suggested that the United States simply needed to "do Sicario." I was struck not only by the irony, given that the movie explicitly conveys the futility of using violence to achieve political ends, but also by the fact that a member of the United States government believed a film should influence policy decisions.

While often left vague in what this would actually look like, it’s not difficult to see that the references to “bombing drug factories” and “killing cartel leaders” are a manifestation of the violence the U.S. unleashes in the movie. For the past four decades, U.S. policy in combating drug cartels has prioritized partnering with local governments over unilateral military action. However, the failure to curb the flow of drugs and the growing political polarization around the border and immigration has pushed the use of military force in Mexico—whether covertly or overtly—into the mainstream of GOP discourse.

As much as the border has become militarized, the ties between the two countries could not be closer. The 1,951-mile U.S.-Mexico border, with 47 active land ports of entry, is still the busiest in the world, facilitating the entry of over 300 million people annually, along with approximately 90 million cars and 4.3 million truck crossings. From January to November 2022, the arrival of U.S. citizens by air into Mexico reached 11.7 million. Cancun, Cozumel, and Cabo see an endless parade of Americans arrive daily for vacations, bachelor parties, and weddings. Approximately 1.6 million U.S. citizens reside in Mexico, including U.S.-born children of Mexican nationals who have returned to Mexico. As of 2022, an estimated 36 million people of Mexican descent live in the United States, making them the largest Hispanic group in the country.

U.S. Special Forces are everywhere in the world carrying out a variety of missions, so it’s no surprise that their use in Mexico has become a more “mainstream” idea. The unilateral operation of U.S. military special forces in Mexico would present a host of strategic and diplomatic pitfalls. But historically, the U.S.-Mexico relationship has been fraught with tension over sovereignty and intervention. Special forces operations conducted without the explicit consent of the Mexican government would likely be viewed as the textbook definition of a flagrant violation of Mexico's sovereignty. This would undermine bilateral relations and could incite widespread anti-American sentiment within Mexico, further destabilizing an already delicate security environment.

Such operations risk deepening mistrust between the two nations, making it harder to collaborate on shared security priorities like combating drug cartels, human trafficking, and organized crime. Mexico has long been sensitive to foreign military involvement on its soil due to a history of U.S. interventions, such as the Mexican-American War in the mid-19th century and the U.S. occupation of Veracruz in 1914. Unilateral action could reopen historical wounds and weaken existing frameworks for cooperation, such as the Merida Initiative, which fosters shared efforts against organized crime. From 2008 to 2022, the United States allocated approximately $3 billion for equipment, training, and capacity-building initiatives to strengthen Mexico's justice and law enforcement sectors. U.S. Law Enforcement has spent many years building ties with its partners in Mexico, but this would almost certainly be stopped altogether.

On a practical level, unilateral special forces operations could have counterproductive effects. They would likely halt most, if not all, of the trade between the U.S. and Mexico, totaling an estimated $855.1 billion in 2022, including $362.0 billion in exports and $493.1 billion in imports. Using military assets in the air would disrupt the airspace in the Southern United States and Mexico.

Mexico’s cartels have deep roots in local communities both in Mexico, and the United States, and an overt U.S. military presence could be exploited as propaganda to paint the Mexican government as complicit with foreign powers. This could bolster cartel recruitment and undermine the Mexican government's legitimacy in its citizens' eyes. Furthermore, despite their expertise and experience, special forces would face significant challenges navigating Mexico’s complex socio-political and geographical landscape. Operations launched from the United States would require a range of supporting elements, which would increasingly give the operation the appearance of a conventional military mission rather than a covert one. For sustained operations, basing in Mexico would be essential, and doing so unilaterally would effectively amount to an invasion.

This doesn’t even account for the fact that cartels such as Los Zetas, Sinaloa, and CJNG now operate with sophisticated military equipment, including armored vehicles, armed drones, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), heavy weapons (most of which are trafficked from the United States into Mexico), and even surface-to-air missiles including Javelins. Additionally, many cartel members receive tactical training from former Mexican military personnel (some of whom have been trained by U.S. personnel), making them highly skilled in asymmetric warfare tactics. These capabilities pose significant challenges to U.S. forces, as engaging such groups could lead to a prolonged and costly conflict. Cartels often possess near-peer combat capabilities, particularly when facing the elite units of the Mexican military and law enforcement. They also capitalize on their intimate knowledge of local terrain and garner support from communities within their controlled territories, creating a highly challenging and intricate environment for any foreign intervention. The potential for collateral damage, civilian casualties, and operational failures is significant, which could not only exacerbate the security crisis but also fuel public outrage in both the United States and Mexico.

Additionally, unilateral action would have severe legal ramifications. Under international law, Mexico could challenge such operations in international forums, portraying the U.S. as a violator of state sovereignty. Political leaders and other officials have often cited the “Unwilling or Unable” doctrine as justification for this. The doctrine is a principle in international law that justifies a state's use of force on the territory of another state when the latter is either unwilling or unable to prevent non-state actors from using its territory to carry out attacks. This doctrine allows for military intervention without the host country's consent, citing the need to protect national security. However, this is more of a loophole than a firmly established law.

Using this doctrine as justification against its largest trading partner and a closed country, the United States would risk mirroring the rogue states it has spent years working to counter. This would harm the U.S.’s global reputation and potentially weaken its standing in international coalitions, particularly among nations in Latin America that have similarly sensitive relationships with U.S. military influence. The idea that U.S. adversaries such as China, who have already made deep inroads into Latin America with the Belt and Road Initiative, would not take full advantage is a foolish assumption. In the worst-case scenario, they could even take it one step further and supply the cartels with even more sophisticated weapons and intelligence, especially given that a considerable amount of fentanyl that flows from China to Mexico.

Lastly, operating without the cooperation of Mexican authorities would forfeit valuable intelligence and local knowledge that are critical to mission success. Mexican law enforcement and military forces possess indispensable insights into the cartels' structures and operations. There are Mexican military and law enforcement officials currently working at NORTHCOM and on DEA task forces to deal with these very issues; pulling them out would certainly be one of the first formal protests by the Mexican government. Alienating these allies through unilateral action would deprive U.S. forces of these resources, severely limiting the effectiveness and sustainability of any long-term operation.

The use of drone strikes in Mexico, particularly against drug cartels, has also become a popular talking point.¹ They’re cheap, don’t require a lot of (if any) human capital to manage in the target area, and can essentially strike targets anywhere in Mexico. However, this would likely replicate many of the challenges and failures observed in Pakistan during the War in Afghanistan. Many members of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups took refuge there because U.S. forces in Afghanistan could not reach them. In response, the U.S. started using drones which were originally used for reconnaissance to fly directly into Pakistani air space and strike a variety of targets in the tribal areas and cities close to the border. The outrage in Pakistan, both publicly and privately, among the government and civilian population, is the clearest sign of what could happen.

U.S. drone strikes were aimed at eliminating high-value terrorist targets in regions where the central government had limited control, such as the tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While these strikes occasionally succeeded in neutralizing key figures, they often caused significant collateral damage, including civilian casualties, destruction of property, and displacement of communities. These outcomes generated widespread resentment toward the United States and its counterterrorism strategies, undermined the legitimacy of the Pakistani government, and fueled anti-American sentiment that extremist groups exploited for recruitment.

Applying a similar approach in Mexico would risk similar consequences. Cartels, like terrorist organizations, are deeply embedded within local communities, often using civilians as shields and leveraging their influence over local economies and governments. Drone strikes targeting cartel leaders could inadvertently harm civilians, damage infrastructure, and create a perception that the U.S. prioritizes military action over the well-being of Mexican citizens. If your family regularly visits Cancun or Cozumel, you might want to reconsider, as such actions could spark widespread outrage both in Mexico and internationally.

Moreover, drone strikes often fail to address the root causes of insecurity. In Pakistan, eliminating individual leaders did little to dismantle the structural and ideological foundations of terrorist groups. Similarly, targeting cartel leaders in Mexico would not resolve any of the underlying economic, social, and political factors that fuel the drug trade, such as poverty, corruption, and weak institutions. In fact, the decapitation of cartel leadership often leads to power struggles and fragmentation, resulting in increased violence and instability, as seen in Mexico’s ongoing cartel wars.

Operationally, drone strikes in Mexico would face unique challenges. Unlike the remote tribal areas of Pakistan, many cartel strongholds are located in densely populated urban areas, increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties and collateral damage. This would complicate the use of precision strikes and raise significant ethical and legal concerns. Additionally, the Mexican government, which has historically resisted foreign military involvement, would likely view drone strikes as yet another gross violation of their country’s sovereignty, creating a diplomatic crisis that could derail broader security cooperation.

Ultimately, the experience in Pakistan demonstrates that drone strikes are a limited and often counterproductive tool for addressing complex security challenges. The idea that combatting the drug cartels would somehow be simplified by using military force is a fool’s errand. In Mexico, such an approach would risk escalating violence, alienating key partners, and deepening the very instability it seeks to resolve. Any serious strategy would strengthen Mexican institutions, foster economic development, and enhance bilateral collaboration to address the root causes of organized crime and insecurity.

A Drone in action in the film Sicario: Day of the Soldado

There is also a clear escalation ladder of violence that could boomerang back around directly into the United States. Discussing the “escalation ladder” often comes when looking at state-vs-state violence but often doesn’t look at how non-state actors escalate in response to the actions of a state. The ladder between the cartels and the United States would likely begin with limited, covert operations targeting high-value cartel leaders or disrupting drug supply chains. Such actions, while intended to minimize visibility, could provoke cartel retaliation, including attacks on U.S. personnel, facilities, or allies. U.S. citizens and law enforcement working in Mexico have primarily been viewed as “off-limits” by cartels, likely out of fear of severe retaliation. However, one might ask why they wouldn't target these individuals at the first opportunity.

In response to that, the U.S. might escalate to overt military strikes or expanded intelligence operations, increasing pressure on cartel networks. This, however, could trigger further cartel escalation, such as widespread violence, targeting of the 15 million civilians living in San Diego, El Paso, and Laredo, or economic sabotage. As the conflict escalates, the United States might deploy additional military and law enforcement resources both within Mexico and domestically. This could result in extended engagements that mirror the protracted counterinsurgency operations the U.S. experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. Advanced cartel tactics, including asymmetric warfare and leveraging local support, would compound challenges, creating a cycle of action and reaction with significant risks to stability in Mexico and the border region. This all could take a matter of months and would likely be accelerated because of the close geographic proximity.

Even if President Biden is reelected, there will inevitably be another Republican President, whether that be Trump or someone else. Control of both houses will give them carte blanche over U.S. foreign policy.² Even without control of Congress, the President has wide latitude to use military force abroad. We’ll almost certainly reach an election where the use of military force becomes a bullet point in a GOP foreign policy agenda. In the coming years, Congress will likely see the introduction of a bill authorizing the use of military force against drug cartels. While it may primarily serve as a symbolic gesture and deliberately remain vague, its introduction would further normalize and mainstream the concept of military intervention in this context.³ Most experts have dismissed this idea out of hand. But enough people in positions of power and influence are talking about this, so you might as well take them literally, not seriously.

The allure of Sicario is that it presents a seemingly simple way to deal with the war on drugs; surprise, kill, and vanish Global War on Terror style. However, the reality is that addressing the challenges posed by drug cartels in Mexico has always required—and will continue to require—a nuanced and cooperative approach rather than relying on unilateral military actions or dropping bombs and missiles. History has shown, both in Pakistan and elsewhere, that such measures often exacerbate the problem by fostering resentment, undermining local governance, and failing to address the systemic issues driving insecurity. In Mexico, these strategies would likely provoke severe diplomatic fallout, inflame anti-American sentiment, destabilize bilateral relations to a point of no return, and bring the violence the United States is trying to combat back home. The more feasible options have always been to bolster Mexican institutions, invest in economic development, and foster shared intelligence and operational cooperation. By respecting Mexico’s sovereignty and working collaboratively, the United States can address the shared security challenges more constructively and ensure long-term stability in the region.

1. Drone Strikes are also used in the second film of the Sicario franchise.

2. President Biden dropped out of the race in June 2024.

3. An AUMF against the drug cartels was introduced in January 2023 by Dan Crenshaw and Mike Waltz, now President-elect Trump’s National Security Advisor.