Agreed, a good summary of WWII AirPower. Phillips Payson’s “How the war was won” also makes a good argument that air and sea power were the decisive factors in defeating the Axis powers. Land battles not so much.
Well researched and written. In my highly un-expert opinion, the strategic bombing campaign in the ETO caused hundreds and hundreds of German 88s, their crews, and supply and support network, and related energy to be diverted from the front to defend civilian and industrial targets in the Fatherland. The same could be said for fighters needed for interception instead of imposing air superiority over whatever front. A similar expense in material, manpower, and energy was required to harden production facilities and construct them in inconvenient locations subject to transport disruption by the same bombing campaign. In my mind, it’s about which side could best bear this expense in terms of manpower, brainpower, material, and energy.
The allies had a steady stream of aircraft and crews. The Germans did not. The allies could invest in new technologies related to air war without greatly impacting investment elsewhere. The B-29 is the prime example. The Germans had the Me-262 etc but could only just make it work and it was at great cost both in terms of material but also in the tremendous expense and energy in building underground factories. Add to that the difficulty in finding and training pilots that could handle the new jets.
When I read these reports it seems to me the writers are taking a Taylorism approach as they might to the direct costs of production of a Buick. Yes, German production increased late in the war but at what cost? I bet if you compared the total cost of building a tiger in 1943 to the cost in 1945 the latter cost would be completely unsustainable, if you include all direct and indirect costs incurred. Cost includes energy expended.
Just my partially informed opinion. Thanks for taking the time and care to write such an interesting article.
PS: Have you read or written anything about the impact of energy on the war effort? Not just oil wells, tankers, and refineries but the overall energy/work of waging modern war? The allies had relatively easy and inexpensive access to energy in all its forms. It was barely a limitation. On the other hand, the Germans increasingly relied on slave energy/labor to create and operate their underground factories, for example.
My (provisional) assessment of strategic bombing is that it had a poor return on investment. Building thousands of bombers to marginally diminish German industrial capacity (even while it increases in absolute terms) is not great.
At the same time, capacity isn’t entirely mutable, so it wasn’t necessarily an option to just forgo a bomber fleet and have a few more thousand half-tracks and tanks instead. Likewise, ground combat for the Western allies was fairly limited until late in the war. Bombing provided an avenue to wage war before it was possible to cross the Channel.
However, increased arms production could have used to aid the Soviets or a focus on tactical and operational use of bombing could have enabled more effective maneuver once landing.
Strategic bombing also forced the Axis to divert considerable resources to defend their homeland areas and key industrial sites. These resources could not then be sent forward to combat areas, and it also forced an Axis nations to increase defensive fighter production instead of bombers of their own.
I posit the key questions are:
1. Can you successfully identify and target strategic enemy targets with enough resources to achieve your goals against them (destroy, neutralize or suppress in order to limit, delay, disrupt, etc.)?
2. Can you target the targets in question using other means and achieve your goals against them?
3. Does a strategic bombing campaign divert too many resources, of all types, from your overall efforts to achieve victory?
Not that I am a fan of “Bomber” Harris, night time bombing raids or targeting civilians, but in certain cases, strategic bombing is a viable option, particularly if you do not have ballistic missiles.
Basically, strategic bombing and its tactical counterpart, were not capable of winning the war. They were, however, a critical component of the Allied war effort especially during periods when the western allies had no other means of entering combat in (over) Europe.
The strategic bombing campaign over Germany diverted monumental resources that would have been otherwise expended in other offensive ways. Perhaps most importantly, the specter of defeat was obvious to the German population who saw the endless streams of bombers, day and night as their cities were bombed to rubble and ashes. At the end of WWI the German civilian population had no visual, concrete evidence of defeat. Towards the end of WWII no German civilians had any doubt about defeat. Contrary to the studies, my personal discussions with Germans in the 1950’s through 1970’s revealed continued, mass PTSD from the bombing campaign. Hardly a German family was spared the death of relatives and the destruction of cities rendering them unrecognizable. Hardly any German soldier on the Eastern or Western Front failed to comment on his concerns for the bombing of the fatherland and their concerns for relatives.
In short, the physical impacts were quantifiable and the psychological immeasurable. This leaves us with the question if the war could have been won without strategic bombing. I suspect it could have been but at far greater cost to both the Soviet Union and Anglo American forces.
Modern war must be focused on convincing the enemy population that they are being defeated. Nothing makes that more clear than the destruction of factories, facilities and cities before they have seen their first enemy soldier.
If you were riding public transport in post WWII Germany at 1200 the first Monday of each month when Air Raid sirens were tested you could clearly see that moment of anguish and fear in the eyes of the riders. Their trauma was palpable years after the fact. They were not unlike the population of Vicksburg, MS after the 4th of July surrender in our Civil War. Vicksburg did not celebrate the 4th of July again until well after WWII some 80 years later.
Had we bombed Hanoi for weeks on end the North might have had had second thoughts. Misplaced compassion will not allow us to know.
Obviously, as the comments note, the strategic bombing had positive affect in the ETO. People who denied it were either motivated in other areas, or just stupid. But, in the PTO, it too had an obvious positive affect. It did displace 800,000. It did burn down cities. The B29s could fly without having to deal with fighters or anti air craft fire. (More B29s crashed due to their own problems than to enemy fire) And of course, dropping the atomic bombs was the ultimate strategic bombing bringing Japan to surrender.
In Korea, the strategic bombing worked, it was just unintended consequences of it working. If it hadn't work, China might not have come into the fight.
The problem with modern warfare, is society has lost it's stomach to make total war.
I don’t have any in depth experience on this but I think I agree with the in between group. Destroying military capability is an important goal and I don’t see how bombing cities helps in any appreciable way.
Agreed, a good summary of WWII AirPower. Phillips Payson’s “How the war was won” also makes a good argument that air and sea power were the decisive factors in defeating the Axis powers. Land battles not so much.
Oops, I meant to reference Phillips O’Brien, no Payson
Well researched and written. In my highly un-expert opinion, the strategic bombing campaign in the ETO caused hundreds and hundreds of German 88s, their crews, and supply and support network, and related energy to be diverted from the front to defend civilian and industrial targets in the Fatherland. The same could be said for fighters needed for interception instead of imposing air superiority over whatever front. A similar expense in material, manpower, and energy was required to harden production facilities and construct them in inconvenient locations subject to transport disruption by the same bombing campaign. In my mind, it’s about which side could best bear this expense in terms of manpower, brainpower, material, and energy.
The allies had a steady stream of aircraft and crews. The Germans did not. The allies could invest in new technologies related to air war without greatly impacting investment elsewhere. The B-29 is the prime example. The Germans had the Me-262 etc but could only just make it work and it was at great cost both in terms of material but also in the tremendous expense and energy in building underground factories. Add to that the difficulty in finding and training pilots that could handle the new jets.
When I read these reports it seems to me the writers are taking a Taylorism approach as they might to the direct costs of production of a Buick. Yes, German production increased late in the war but at what cost? I bet if you compared the total cost of building a tiger in 1943 to the cost in 1945 the latter cost would be completely unsustainable, if you include all direct and indirect costs incurred. Cost includes energy expended.
Just my partially informed opinion. Thanks for taking the time and care to write such an interesting article.
PS: Have you read or written anything about the impact of energy on the war effort? Not just oil wells, tankers, and refineries but the overall energy/work of waging modern war? The allies had relatively easy and inexpensive access to energy in all its forms. It was barely a limitation. On the other hand, the Germans increasingly relied on slave energy/labor to create and operate their underground factories, for example.
My (provisional) assessment of strategic bombing is that it had a poor return on investment. Building thousands of bombers to marginally diminish German industrial capacity (even while it increases in absolute terms) is not great.
At the same time, capacity isn’t entirely mutable, so it wasn’t necessarily an option to just forgo a bomber fleet and have a few more thousand half-tracks and tanks instead. Likewise, ground combat for the Western allies was fairly limited until late in the war. Bombing provided an avenue to wage war before it was possible to cross the Channel.
However, increased arms production could have used to aid the Soviets or a focus on tactical and operational use of bombing could have enabled more effective maneuver once landing.
Strategic bombing also forced the Axis to divert considerable resources to defend their homeland areas and key industrial sites. These resources could not then be sent forward to combat areas, and it also forced an Axis nations to increase defensive fighter production instead of bombers of their own.
I posit the key questions are:
1. Can you successfully identify and target strategic enemy targets with enough resources to achieve your goals against them (destroy, neutralize or suppress in order to limit, delay, disrupt, etc.)?
2. Can you target the targets in question using other means and achieve your goals against them?
3. Does a strategic bombing campaign divert too many resources, of all types, from your overall efforts to achieve victory?
Not that I am a fan of “Bomber” Harris, night time bombing raids or targeting civilians, but in certain cases, strategic bombing is a viable option, particularly if you do not have ballistic missiles.
Many battles worth of equipment never made it to actual battles.
Basically, strategic bombing and its tactical counterpart, were not capable of winning the war. They were, however, a critical component of the Allied war effort especially during periods when the western allies had no other means of entering combat in (over) Europe.
The strategic bombing campaign over Germany diverted monumental resources that would have been otherwise expended in other offensive ways. Perhaps most importantly, the specter of defeat was obvious to the German population who saw the endless streams of bombers, day and night as their cities were bombed to rubble and ashes. At the end of WWI the German civilian population had no visual, concrete evidence of defeat. Towards the end of WWII no German civilians had any doubt about defeat. Contrary to the studies, my personal discussions with Germans in the 1950’s through 1970’s revealed continued, mass PTSD from the bombing campaign. Hardly a German family was spared the death of relatives and the destruction of cities rendering them unrecognizable. Hardly any German soldier on the Eastern or Western Front failed to comment on his concerns for the bombing of the fatherland and their concerns for relatives.
In short, the physical impacts were quantifiable and the psychological immeasurable. This leaves us with the question if the war could have been won without strategic bombing. I suspect it could have been but at far greater cost to both the Soviet Union and Anglo American forces.
Modern war must be focused on convincing the enemy population that they are being defeated. Nothing makes that more clear than the destruction of factories, facilities and cities before they have seen their first enemy soldier.
If you were riding public transport in post WWII Germany at 1200 the first Monday of each month when Air Raid sirens were tested you could clearly see that moment of anguish and fear in the eyes of the riders. Their trauma was palpable years after the fact. They were not unlike the population of Vicksburg, MS after the 4th of July surrender in our Civil War. Vicksburg did not celebrate the 4th of July again until well after WWII some 80 years later.
Had we bombed Hanoi for weeks on end the North might have had had second thoughts. Misplaced compassion will not allow us to know.
Obviously, as the comments note, the strategic bombing had positive affect in the ETO. People who denied it were either motivated in other areas, or just stupid. But, in the PTO, it too had an obvious positive affect. It did displace 800,000. It did burn down cities. The B29s could fly without having to deal with fighters or anti air craft fire. (More B29s crashed due to their own problems than to enemy fire) And of course, dropping the atomic bombs was the ultimate strategic bombing bringing Japan to surrender.
In Korea, the strategic bombing worked, it was just unintended consequences of it working. If it hadn't work, China might not have come into the fight.
The problem with modern warfare, is society has lost it's stomach to make total war.
I don’t have any in depth experience on this but I think I agree with the in between group. Destroying military capability is an important goal and I don’t see how bombing cities helps in any appreciable way.
Diverting resources... for defence of the Reich. Therefore ...not on the front.
> He believed strategic bombing would bring wars before a navy at sea or army on land could strike a decisive blow.
Missing word I think