This is stonkingly great work mate, well done! I absolutely adore First World War history - the ultimate steampunk experience (my favourite anecdote is that of British submariners surfacing to then BOARD an enemy vessel...with CUTLASSES), and still very relevant to our present day.
1914 is almost mythical in its scope, which I think you have captured well - so many conflicting viewpoints of one of the most interesting points in European history. I'm not sure where I am with the Schlieffen Plan; potentially doomed from the start but the least-bad out of several crap options for Germany. A two-front war was never going to go well, and the fact that the Germans came very close to clinching it on several occasions - even up to the end of the war - is frankly testament to the sheer survivability of the industrial nation state and the capacity of the German military machine. While I agree that American involvement in the end (sheer reserves of fresh, if inexperienced, manpower) probably was the straw that broke the camel's back in 1918 (especially following the Spring Offensive), I would also note the crippling blockade enforced by the Royal Navy. Germany was literally at the point of starvation by the end of the war, often forgotten in the popular imagination.
Also recall the disastrous French offensive (Plan 19) against the German frontier in 1914. Massive casualties for the French army with almost no gain in territory. Not only could the Germans hold the French off in the West but in the actual event they did.
I recall some historians criticizing the German response to the French attack arguing that they should have even encouraged the French to march in that direction while the Germans came down on Paris from Belgium behind them. And there may have been a few divisions sent to reinforce the German defense instead of marching on the right flank.
A German diplomatic peace offensive in the west at the same time that it attacked in the east may have kept Britain out and might even created a "phony war" with France. In the event of a French attack, on a necessarily narrow front, the Germans could have contained it -- the French would not have dared to violate Belgian neutrality! The German government could have claimed that it only wanted to support its ally Austria-Hungary against terrorism and disorder on its frontier, and was strictly responding to the Russian threat. Germany could have trumpeted its respect for Belgian neutrality and its regard for Britain and its interests, and its desire to restrict its war to Britain's traditional enemy, Russia. If Britain were kept out, and no blockade of German and neutral shipping, Germany would have been much stronger. It is hard to imagine Asquith's Liberal government could have gotten Britain into the war if the Germans had made those overtures, and stayed out of Belgium.
Despite the risks and imponderables of the eastern plan, it is hard to imagine the war could have gone WORSE for Germany than it actually did.
Agreed! I would add that not drawing Britain into the war by invading Belgium would have meant no devastating blockade by the Royal Navy. The import dependent German Empire suffered mightily, as well as losing all its overseas colonies. But then the Germans have always discounted sea power.
Hi Rob, Britain's potential response is an interesting point to consider isn't it. And even if Britain did intervene its aid would have been different. Britain was unique amongst the Great Powers because it had a very small but completely professional army, its colonies could provide forces but that took time. The British Expeditionary Force was sent to Europe because of Germany's direct threat to the Low Countries, Britain's historic trade hub for Europe. If Germany had gone East, Britain would probably have responded but I think it would have been mostly naval and it is unlikely the Empire's land power would have been mobilised. But who knows? And its interesting to speculate.
Speaking of naval solutions, what do you think of the Fisher Plan?
Invading Denmark or southern Sweden to cut off Germany from its iron ore imports, and possibly juke the Germans into 'striking first' is a bold strategy for sure. I wonder how well it would work out if Fisher had been more talkative and not gotten sidelined by Churchill.
Awesome question, I think the chances of success depended on whether it is 'full' Baltic plan including an invasion of Pomerania. Or just blockades based around lodgments in Denmark and Heligoland. In my opinion the key issue in either possible iteration of the plan is the small size of Britain's land forces. I recollect seeing historian, Chris Pugsley argue that WW1's great strategic gamble at Gallipoli failed because a large amphibious operation requires highly professional infantry. And by 1915 the BEF (Britain's very capable professional army) had been destroyed. So historically, Britain lacked the capability for a complex amphibious operation. However, if the BEF was not destroyed, would it have been big enough to achieve the required lodgment? I don't know but it is certainly an interesting question. Then there is the naval question, could the Royal Navy force passage into the Baltic? Another interesting question for people interested in alternate histories.
Your map sketch sadly reminds me that Stalin, on his way to Germany, stopped outside the walls of Warsaw, thus failing the Polish resistance movement, which expected Stalin to quickly conquer the city. The combination of the Soviet forces outside the city and the resistance movement inside, would quickly cause the Germans to retreat further west.
But Stalin did not like the Polish resistance movement, which was not communist. Therefore, he stopped his troops outside Warsaw and let the Germans, in a fit of rage, murder the Polish resistance movement, destroy the city and slaughter the city's inhabitants.
To understand the Schlieffen plan you need to understand the population and industrial dynamics of the great powers in Europe at the time. There was the entente cordiale (Britian, France and Russia) facing the central powers (Germany and Austria).
The industrial capacity of Britain and France exceeded that of Germany and Austria. The combined armies of France and Russia far exceeded the combined forces of Germany and Austria. Britain and Germany were both highly dependent on imports of raw materials and food. Britain protected those imports with a very powerful navy. Its naval policy was to maintain enough ships to defeat any two other great powers combined. Germany tried to protect its imports by building a navy as powerful as the British navy, but they never got anywhere near that goal.
The basic question Schlieffen and the German high command faced was;
What do you do when you are massively outnumbered, surrounded and cut off from essential supplies?
At that time the only way to make explosives in the huge quantities needed for a major war was to use salt peter (sodium nitrate) imported from South America. Obviously Germany could not count on being able to import it during a war which meant the Germans had to find some way to hopefully bring any war to a conclusion in a few months before stockpiles ran out. What actually happened was Haber developed a way of producing ammonia in large quantities that could then be used to produce explosives. There was no way this could have been foreseen when the Schlieffen plan was being developed.
The British government used the German march through Belgium as a convenient excuse to go to war but there was a very powerful coalition of forces in the British Empire that would have gone to war with Germany whatever happened. The colonialists wanted the German colonies. The industrialists wanted to destroy German industry, and the British had a long very successful history of keeping the continentals fighting so they could control the rest of the world. They had supported the Turks against the French, the Germans, Russians and Austrians against the French, the French and the Turks against the Russians, the Italians against the Turks the Japanese against the Russians, the Russians against the Austrians and the French against the Germans. There was no way in 1914 the British would have sat back and let the Germans defeat either the Russians or the French without intervening.
The Schlieffen plan was never some great plan to conquer the world. It was a highly risky desperate move that made full use of Germany's only advantage, speed of mobilisation. The fact that it came close to working is a tribute to the skill of the German high command and the bravery of its soldiers.
I've always been intrigued by Zuber's interpretation, and while Ehlert, Epkenhans, Gross tend to discount it, arguing the Germans gave up their eastern plans in the 1901-02 Aufsmarsch (the last year 4 Armies of 16 Corps each were allocated to each front; by 1903-04 they’d shifted to 25 Corps in the West, 3 in the East), it's a thoughtful ‘what if.’ As you note, the loss of records means we’ll likely never know. But indeed, given the disasters that followed Wilson's intervention (worst potus ever), any sane person should wish for the Kaiser's victory, or better yet, no stupid war at all. A steampunk Europa was a better future than the one we got.
This is stonkingly great work mate, well done! I absolutely adore First World War history - the ultimate steampunk experience (my favourite anecdote is that of British submariners surfacing to then BOARD an enemy vessel...with CUTLASSES), and still very relevant to our present day.
1914 is almost mythical in its scope, which I think you have captured well - so many conflicting viewpoints of one of the most interesting points in European history. I'm not sure where I am with the Schlieffen Plan; potentially doomed from the start but the least-bad out of several crap options for Germany. A two-front war was never going to go well, and the fact that the Germans came very close to clinching it on several occasions - even up to the end of the war - is frankly testament to the sheer survivability of the industrial nation state and the capacity of the German military machine. While I agree that American involvement in the end (sheer reserves of fresh, if inexperienced, manpower) probably was the straw that broke the camel's back in 1918 (especially following the Spring Offensive), I would also note the crippling blockade enforced by the Royal Navy. Germany was literally at the point of starvation by the end of the war, often forgotten in the popular imagination.
Also recall the disastrous French offensive (Plan 19) against the German frontier in 1914. Massive casualties for the French army with almost no gain in territory. Not only could the Germans hold the French off in the West but in the actual event they did.
I recall some historians criticizing the German response to the French attack arguing that they should have even encouraged the French to march in that direction while the Germans came down on Paris from Belgium behind them. And there may have been a few divisions sent to reinforce the German defense instead of marching on the right flank.
A German diplomatic peace offensive in the west at the same time that it attacked in the east may have kept Britain out and might even created a "phony war" with France. In the event of a French attack, on a necessarily narrow front, the Germans could have contained it -- the French would not have dared to violate Belgian neutrality! The German government could have claimed that it only wanted to support its ally Austria-Hungary against terrorism and disorder on its frontier, and was strictly responding to the Russian threat. Germany could have trumpeted its respect for Belgian neutrality and its regard for Britain and its interests, and its desire to restrict its war to Britain's traditional enemy, Russia. If Britain were kept out, and no blockade of German and neutral shipping, Germany would have been much stronger. It is hard to imagine Asquith's Liberal government could have gotten Britain into the war if the Germans had made those overtures, and stayed out of Belgium.
Despite the risks and imponderables of the eastern plan, it is hard to imagine the war could have gone WORSE for Germany than it actually did.
A fantastic article, very interesting, thanks.
Agreed! I would add that not drawing Britain into the war by invading Belgium would have meant no devastating blockade by the Royal Navy. The import dependent German Empire suffered mightily, as well as losing all its overseas colonies. But then the Germans have always discounted sea power.
Hi Rob, Britain's potential response is an interesting point to consider isn't it. And even if Britain did intervene its aid would have been different. Britain was unique amongst the Great Powers because it had a very small but completely professional army, its colonies could provide forces but that took time. The British Expeditionary Force was sent to Europe because of Germany's direct threat to the Low Countries, Britain's historic trade hub for Europe. If Germany had gone East, Britain would probably have responded but I think it would have been mostly naval and it is unlikely the Empire's land power would have been mobilised. But who knows? And its interesting to speculate.
Speaking of naval solutions, what do you think of the Fisher Plan?
Invading Denmark or southern Sweden to cut off Germany from its iron ore imports, and possibly juke the Germans into 'striking first' is a bold strategy for sure. I wonder how well it would work out if Fisher had been more talkative and not gotten sidelined by Churchill.
Awesome question, I think the chances of success depended on whether it is 'full' Baltic plan including an invasion of Pomerania. Or just blockades based around lodgments in Denmark and Heligoland. In my opinion the key issue in either possible iteration of the plan is the small size of Britain's land forces. I recollect seeing historian, Chris Pugsley argue that WW1's great strategic gamble at Gallipoli failed because a large amphibious operation requires highly professional infantry. And by 1915 the BEF (Britain's very capable professional army) had been destroyed. So historically, Britain lacked the capability for a complex amphibious operation. However, if the BEF was not destroyed, would it have been big enough to achieve the required lodgment? I don't know but it is certainly an interesting question. Then there is the naval question, could the Royal Navy force passage into the Baltic? Another interesting question for people interested in alternate histories.
Great point. People often forget how buggered Germany was economically by the end of the war - serious food shortages to the point of famine.
Your map sketch sadly reminds me that Stalin, on his way to Germany, stopped outside the walls of Warsaw, thus failing the Polish resistance movement, which expected Stalin to quickly conquer the city. The combination of the Soviet forces outside the city and the resistance movement inside, would quickly cause the Germans to retreat further west.
But Stalin did not like the Polish resistance movement, which was not communist. Therefore, he stopped his troops outside Warsaw and let the Germans, in a fit of rage, murder the Polish resistance movement, destroy the city and slaughter the city's inhabitants.
A very interesting discussion.
To understand the Schlieffen plan you need to understand the population and industrial dynamics of the great powers in Europe at the time. There was the entente cordiale (Britian, France and Russia) facing the central powers (Germany and Austria).
The industrial capacity of Britain and France exceeded that of Germany and Austria. The combined armies of France and Russia far exceeded the combined forces of Germany and Austria. Britain and Germany were both highly dependent on imports of raw materials and food. Britain protected those imports with a very powerful navy. Its naval policy was to maintain enough ships to defeat any two other great powers combined. Germany tried to protect its imports by building a navy as powerful as the British navy, but they never got anywhere near that goal.
The basic question Schlieffen and the German high command faced was;
What do you do when you are massively outnumbered, surrounded and cut off from essential supplies?
At that time the only way to make explosives in the huge quantities needed for a major war was to use salt peter (sodium nitrate) imported from South America. Obviously Germany could not count on being able to import it during a war which meant the Germans had to find some way to hopefully bring any war to a conclusion in a few months before stockpiles ran out. What actually happened was Haber developed a way of producing ammonia in large quantities that could then be used to produce explosives. There was no way this could have been foreseen when the Schlieffen plan was being developed.
The British government used the German march through Belgium as a convenient excuse to go to war but there was a very powerful coalition of forces in the British Empire that would have gone to war with Germany whatever happened. The colonialists wanted the German colonies. The industrialists wanted to destroy German industry, and the British had a long very successful history of keeping the continentals fighting so they could control the rest of the world. They had supported the Turks against the French, the Germans, Russians and Austrians against the French, the French and the Turks against the Russians, the Italians against the Turks the Japanese against the Russians, the Russians against the Austrians and the French against the Germans. There was no way in 1914 the British would have sat back and let the Germans defeat either the Russians or the French without intervening.
The Schlieffen plan was never some great plan to conquer the world. It was a highly risky desperate move that made full use of Germany's only advantage, speed of mobilisation. The fact that it came close to working is a tribute to the skill of the German high command and the bravery of its soldiers.
I've always been intrigued by Zuber's interpretation, and while Ehlert, Epkenhans, Gross tend to discount it, arguing the Germans gave up their eastern plans in the 1901-02 Aufsmarsch (the last year 4 Armies of 16 Corps each were allocated to each front; by 1903-04 they’d shifted to 25 Corps in the West, 3 in the East), it's a thoughtful ‘what if.’ As you note, the loss of records means we’ll likely never know. But indeed, given the disasters that followed Wilson's intervention (worst potus ever), any sane person should wish for the Kaiser's victory, or better yet, no stupid war at all. A steampunk Europa was a better future than the one we got.