Subjective Civilian Control and Battlefield Realties
Hamburger Hill and the Beginning of the End of the American War in Vietnam
Samuel Huntington the godfather of modern American civil-military relations wrote that, “subjective civilian control is fundamentally out of place in any society in which the division of labor has been carried to the point where there emerges a distinct class of specialists in the management of violence.”[1] But what are the circumstances in which subjective control placates the specialists who manage violence? Subjective civilian control refers to the perception or interpretation of civilian authority over military institutions and decision-making processes within a society.[2] In democratic systems, civilian control of the military is a fundamental principle where elected officials, representing the civilian population, exercise authority over the armed forces. However, the extent to which civilian control is perceived or realized can vary depending on several factors, including historical context, political culture, institutional structures, and the attitudes of military leaders. Huntington argues that subjective civilian control is the most powerful definition of civilian control by minimizing the power of the military as much as possible.[3] In real world terms, subjective civilian control can include any direct or indirect intervention by civilians in military policy, strategy, or tactics. But the battle of Hill 937 or Hamburger Hill as it later became known offers an example of how events on the battlefield provide a much bigger incentive for civilian intervention than people give credit too.
The Battle of Hill 937
The battle of Hill 937 that raged from 11–20 May 1969 remains arguably the most controversial battle of the Vietnam War. At the center of that controversy was Weldon Honeycutt (pictured below), commander of 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment who were known as the “Rakkasans.” Honeycutt was a protégé of William Westmoreland, the former commander of the MACV and was already a controversial figure in the army some believing he was an egomaniac but was also in the words of one of his men, “a helluva combat commander.”[4] He had been assigned command of the 3/187th in January 1969 and replaced many of its officers who were incompetent or believed weren’t aggressive.
The A Shau Valley had been a thorn in the side of U.S. forces since they had arrived in the country in 1965. There had been a special forces camp in the valley, but it was eventually evacuated after withering attacks from the NVA. The 1st Calvary Division had fought in the valley after the Tet offensive since it had been used as a staging area but pulled out. There had been another operation in March 1969 by the screaming eagles and the Marines to clear the valley but that was merely a prelude to Operation Apache Snow which began on May 10, 1969.
The initial landing of 450 troops went off without a hitch but by the next day, Bravo Company began to encounter enemy resistance. It became clear to Honeycutt that there was a sizable force; it turned out to be the entirety of the NVA’s crack 29th Regiment, nicknamed “the pride of Ho Chi Minh.” The NVA had occupied the area for years to that point and fortified the terrain with numerous and well-constructed bunkers that could not be destroyed by indirect fire. May 11 would be the first of 3 reconnaissance in force. It wasn’t until May 14 that the Rakkasans of Alpha and Bravo company reached the base of Hill 937. The effectiveness of the paratroopers’ attacks was limited by narrow trails that funneled attacking companies into squad or platoon points of attack, where they encountered NVA platoons and companies with prepared fields of fire. The adventure of Delta Company on May 14 illustrated this, after hours trying to work their way around the hill, constantly harassed by NVA patrols, eventually found themselves pinned down in a ravine with almost half the company, casualties, only close air support and gun runs by helicopters allowed the company to withdraw.[5] With most small arms engagements thus conducted at close range, fire support was also limited. Units frequently pulled back and called in artillery fire and close air support, but the foliage was so dense in the triple canopy jungle and NVA so well dug in that it made it practically ineffective.
After two direct assaults which ran into heavy NVA resistance coupled with multiple friendly fire incidents including a bomb landing directly on Honeycutt’s HQ, reinforcements were brought in. Some Rakkasans would later argue that this should have been done in the very beginning when it was clear there were sizable NVA element in the area.[6] By May 16 the media caught wind of the battle and began to fly in. Associated Press correspondent Jay Sharbutt was in the area taking the temperature of senior commanders. On May 18 he flew into the area directly and captured two of the most infamous quotes of the battle. He asked Private Anthony Tolle his impressions of the battle to which he responded, “All of us are wondering why they just can’t pull back and B52 that hill. I’ve lost a lot of buddies up there. Not many guys can take it much longer.”[7] While later milling around the landing zone, Sharbutt heard a wounded soldier state, “That damn Blackjack (Honeycutt’s call sign) won’t stop until he kills every one of us.”[8] The attribution of the Blackjack quote remains lost to the mystery of history, and some believed that Sharbutt made it up altogether. Regardless the two statements were the center of Sharbutt’s story that started a political storm. Finally, on May 20th the Paratroopers, reinforced by ARVN troops and another battalion from the 101st, took the hill which by that point, had been turned into moonscape. The final assault was anticlimactic as any surviving NVA troops retreated off the mountain when it became obvious that the paratroopers were coming back in force.
Wading through the Aftermath
While American soldiers inspected the hill, one paratrooper scribbled onto a piece of cardboard, “Hamburger Hill”, another added later below, “was it worth it” thus giving the battle the name it largely still goes by today.[9] The final casualty count was 72 killed, 372 wounded, 3/187th had basically been destroyed as a fighting unit. There had been much bloodier battles in Vietnam and as but the media coverage and explosive quotes in Jay Shargutt’s reporting ignited a debate over Hamburger Hill in Congress, with particularly severe criticism of military leadership by Senators Edward Kennedy, George McGovern, and Stephen Young. Senator Kennedy called the battle, “senseless and irresponsible…American boys are too valuable to be sacrificed for a false sense of military pride.”[10] 9 days after the battle, Senator Young stated on the Senate floor, “Our generals in Vietnam acted as if they had never studied Lee and Jackson’s strategy, instead, they fling our paratroopers piecemeal in frontal assaults. Instead of seeking to surround the enemy and seeking to assault the hill from the sides and the front simultaneously, there was one frontal assault after another, killing our boys who went up Hamburger Hill.”[11] It’s ironic that Young said this given that Lee’s tactics did not accomplish anything of strategic value and flanking around Hill 937 had been Honeycutt’s plan all along. Maybe the most damaging statement of all was 45 members of Congress releasing a 61 page report on June 1 that in part called for congress to, “reassert control over the military bureaucracy and the policy decisions it has preempted.”
Under direct attack, Abrams and the 101st Airborne Division commander Melvin Zais felt compelled to defend the 450 casualties, 20,000 rounds of artillery, and 1100 tons of bombs.[12] There is little doubt that that by sheer volume of firepower, U.S. forces had inflicted serious casualties on a crack NVA regiment, the question was though, what was accomplished at Hamburger Hill? Hamburger Hill merely continued what had been a running conversation for three years, what was America doing in Vietnam? There was nothing different about Hamburger Hill than other battles, but it offers an interesting case study of how perceptions on the battlefield can shape civilian authority over the military. There is something to wonder if Sharbutt hadn’t published the story or the battle nicknamed, “Hamburger Hill,” would it have provoked civilian outrage at all as one paratrooper stated, “If Hamburger Hill happened a year earlier, no one would have said a word about it.”[13]
Amidst the turmoil, a pivotal moment emerged—a moment that would redefine American military strategy and mark the beginning of the end for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The head of MACV, Creighton Abrams lamented after that, “You fight them in the A Shau and they piss on you for that, you fight in Hue, and they raise hell about that, you can’t find a good place to fight them.”[14] For the military, Hill 937 was simply the way the United States military had been playing the game forever, the A Shau Valley was an enemy safe have and Operation Apache Snow was put together to take away that safe haven. Robert Harkins, the CO of Alpha Company stated that, “We were there to kill the NVA; we killed as many of the NVA as we could. The hill had no tactical or strategic purpose other than the NVA were on the hill.” But ultimately civilian control of the military trumps everything and in their conclusion, there could not be another Hamburger Hill and U.S. military strategy abruptly changed to “protective reaction” while President Nixon shortly after announced the first withdrawal of U.S. troops.[15] Never again would there be a “meat grinder” or battle over random terrain for the rest of American involvement. Subjective civilian control had beaten objective civilian control.
Honeycutt wasn’t singled out specifically in the media the way that Zais and other American military officials were, but he was the source of his own controversy within the army, most notably a $10,000 dollar hit that was supposedly put out on him by a G.I. underground newspaper. However, his men largely stood by him both after the battle and the war. In fact, many were more furious at the politicians in Washington. Lt. Robert Schmitz of Alpha 1/506 wrote regarding congressional statements that, “I thought it was very inappropriate thing for a statesmen to say, especially considering the fact that the battle was still going on, its one thing to have some hippe tell you you’re a war criminal and quote another to have a U.S. Senator, who is obviously a very powerful force, tell you that you wasted the lives of the men serving under you instead of giving you moral support.”[16] Another paratrooper simply stated regarding Kennedy, “he was an outsider and had no right to get involved in the issue.”[17] What they were all saying and many soldiers felt was perhaps it wasn’t the battlefield commanders who should face the harshest judgment, but rather those who wielded political power from the safety of their offices thousands of miles away who put them in Vietnam in the first place.
One of the survivors of the battle reflected afterwards that the leadership, strategy, and tactics wasn’t specific to Honeycutt or and leader but were merely a “product of the system” but what was that system?[18] There is an entirely separate debate about U.S. Military strategy in Vietnam and whether civilian or military officials had more influence over said strategy.[19] Some scholars argue the origins of the United States’ approach in Vietnam can be attributed to the civilian leaders and the considerable influence of public opinion.[20] Others suggest that U.S. civilian and military officials held the belief that counterinsurgency efforts were primarily the responsibility of South Vietnam, and therefore, U.S. ground forces should refrain from assuming direct responsibility, opting instead to concentrate on “search and destroy” missions.[21] There was never a plan to occupy the A Shau valley, but military officials did not adequately sell their strategy to the public and thus invited a backlash. The lack of cohesive strategy communication between civilian leaders and military officials underscores the challenges inherent in navigating complex conflicts and shaping public perception.
55 years later, the jungles have reclaimed Hill 937, only a small monument just below the peak put up by the Vietnamese government that in part reads, “the anti-American resistance to save the country.” No American monument or markers distinguish the heroism and sacrifice of the Raakasens and others who fought there. But in some respects, no monument to remembrance is perfectly representative of the American War in Vietnam War. Hamburger Hill serves as an illustration of the relationship between civilian authority and military decision-making. Samuel Huntington's assertion about the challenges of subjective civilian control finds resonance in the aftermath of the battle. While military strategy and tactics were scrutinized, it was ultimately the perceptions and interpretations of events on the battlefield, fueled by media coverage and political discourse, that precipitated significant shifts in American military strategy and ultimately led to the reevaluation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The debate surrounding Hamburger Hill reveals the enduring tension between civilian oversight and military autonomy, reminding us that the dynamics of civil-military relations are shaped not only by institutional structures and strategic imperatives but also by the perceptions and voices of those directly impacted by the consequences of war.
References
Division, Headquarters 101st Airborne. 1969. Battle of Dong Ap Bia - Hill 937 10-21 May 1969. After Action Report, San Fransisco: Department of Defense.
Huntington, Samuel. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sorley, Lewis. 1999. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tradgedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt Publishing Company.
Zaffiri, Samuel. 1988. Hamburger Hill: The Brutal Battle for Dong Ap Bia, May 11-20,1969. New York: The Ballantine Publishing Group.
[1] Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 85.
[2] Huntington, 80.
[3] Huntington, 80-81
[4] Samuel Zaffiri, Hamburger Hill: The Brutal Battle for Dong Ap Bia, May 11-20,1969. (New York: The Ballantine Publishing Group. 1988), 288.
[5] Zaffiri, 162.
[6] Zaffiri, 283
[7] Quoted in Zaffiri, 237.
[8] Quoted in Zaffiri, 237.
[9] Zaffari, 273.
[10] Zaffiri, 275.
[11] Zaffiri, 277.
[12] Headquarters 101st Airborne Division. Battle of Dong Ap Bia - Hill 937 10-21 May 1969. After Action Report, San Fransisco: Department of Defense. (1969), 23-24.
[13] Zaffiri, 283.
[14] Quoted in Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt Publishing Company, 1999) 142.
[15] Zaffiri, 279.
[16] Zaffiri, 290.
[17] Zaffiri, 290.
[18] Zaffiri, 289.
[19] See for example, James McAllister; “Who Lost Vietnam? Soldiers, Civilians, and U.S. Military Strategy” International Security 35 (3): (2010); 95–123. Jonathan D. Caverley; “Explaining U.S. Military Strategy in Vietnam: Thinking Clearly about Causation.” International Security; 35 (3): (2010) 124–143. “U.S. Army Strategy in the Vietnam War” International Security (1987); 11 (4): 130–134. Stephen Peter Rosen; “Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War.” International Security 1982; 7 (2): 83–113.
[20] Jonathan D. Caverley; “Explaining U.S. Military Strategy in Vietnam: Thinking Clearly about Causation.” International Security; 35 (3): (2010) 124–143
[21] James McAllister; “Who Lost Vietnam? Soldiers, Civilians, and U.S. Military Strategy” International Security 35 (3): (2010); 95–123
We have JAG in the TOC the entire 21st century for Commanders to get clearance on tactical decisions concerning units in contact with the enemy.
Usually JAG at the Battalion level is an E4. They will explicitly tell you “they don’t work for the Commander.”
They work for JAG.
As far as subjective civilian control, in the 21st century you mean the Media, right?
Thanks for checking in.