Henry Halleck, Military Advising, and the Origins of “McMasterism”
Is it appropriate for military officers to resign in protest of civilian policies?
Henry Halleck is a Union General who wasn’t as well studied or known compared to U.S. Grant, William Sherman, and Phil Sheridan, but he played a critical role in advising the president on strategy and broader military policymaking. He was a prodigy of Dennis Hart Mahan who was a professor of civil and military engineering at the United States Military Academy and the most important figure in bringing the theory and ideas of Antione Jomini to the American Military.
Jomini was a Swiss military officer who served as a general in the French Army under the French Emperor Napoleon, and later in the Russian army producing numerous works on military strategy and policymaking.[1] But why did Jomini become more influential than many others of that period? The simplest explanation offered by historians is that unlike a lot of other writers at that time, Jomini’s work was easier to read and his central principles were simple.[2] Jomini’s central thesis written in his book, The Art of War, concluded that war was built around scientific principles. He described war in six parts: statesmanship, strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering, and minor tactics.[3]
Halleck was one of the few generals in the war who missed out on the Mexican-American War instead being stationed in California where he translated Jomini's book, Political and Military Life of Napoleon. At the onset of the American Civil War, he was appointed the rank of Major General and commanded all Union forces in the Western Theatre. The failure of the Peninsula Campaign in the Summer of 1862 led to his appointment as General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States.
President Lincoln’s and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton’s frustration with General George McClellan’s passiveness as a military commander as well as a lack of uncoordinated strategy between different theatres was the driving force for the creation of the position, General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States.[4] However, Halleck viewed the role more as administrative, and serving as a conduit between the commanders on the ground and the President rather than a true field commander. In a letter to William Sherman, Halleck wrote of his position,
“I am simply a military advisor of the Secretary of War and the President and must obey and carry out what they decide upon, whether I concur in their decisions or not. As a good soldier, I obey the orders of my superiors. If I disagree with them, I say so, but when they decide, is my duty faithfully to carry out their decision.”[5]
Admiral Mike Mullen, the 17th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the modern manifestation of Halleck’s role echoed this sentiment, stating that, “you have the debate, the president makes the decision, and we march on.”[6] Curiously enough, it was Halleck’s own decision to describe himself as a presidential advisor, Lincoln and his civilian advisors didn’t necessarily see it that way and it wasn’t prescribed in law in the way that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now.
Though Halleck was an important figure in creating the advisory capacity from the military to the president, one episode is an important reminder of the democratic civil-military dilemma. In January of 1863, after Ambrose Burnside’s Fredericksburg debacle, he wanted the Army of the Potomac to engage in another offensive into Virginia. Lincoln, knowing the bad weather that was inevitable professed skepticism and asked Halleck to go and assess the situation and give his professional opinion to the president. Halleck refused opting to defer to Burnside, based on his view that, “a general in command of an army in the field is the best judge of the existing condition.”[7] Lincoln promptly wrote back, “Your military skill is useless to me if you will not do this.”[8] In response, Halleck stated that he would resign as general-in-chief if Lincoln ordered him to carry out his assessment. Lincoln decided to back off because his cabinet had already experienced two high-profile resignations in recent months, and the resignation of the general-in-chief of the army would have been politically disastrous for the president.[9] Sure enough, the following campaign became known as the “Mud March” ended in disaster and also ended Ambrose Burnside’s tenure as commander of the Army of the Potomac.
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There are two questions that emerge from Halleck’s action, was his offer to resign a form of professional protest and was it “extreme?” Halleck biographer John Marszalek simply chalked the incident up to the stress of the job but Halleck was a creature of Washington, it’s difficult to believe that he did not know what the outcome would be when he offered to resign, and “boxed in” the president as later American officers would do to their commander in chiefs.[10] Intentional or not, Halleck was committing a political act, even though he viewed it as merely fulfilling his professional responsibility, or more bluntly, "staying in his lane." Dr. Risa Brooks summarizes Halleck's actions by stating that "those who see themselves as professionals define away the possibility that their actions might be political."[11] In terms of being extreme, all current evidence suggests yes. Halleck’s offer was the only example that the author could find in the 19th century of an American general officer offering to resign in response to a civilian order, policy, or directive.
The debate about the appropriateness of senior officers resigning in protest over disagreements with civilian leaders is hotly debated in the study of American civil-military relations.[12] One of the leading scholars in the field, Dr. Peter Feaver published an article in International Security termed the principle of American officers having the “professional” right to insist that civilians heed their advice on military planning and strategy and an obligation to take extreme action if those civilians fail to do so as, “McMasterism.”[13] Feaver further adds that the actual mechanisms of "McMasterism" boil down to a choice between two options: resigning in protest or appealing directly to the American people, Congress, or both, over the president's head.[14]
The term “McMasterism” came out of Army officer H.R. McMaster’s New York Times bestselling book, Dereliction of Duty which blamed military officers for not doing more to voice their reservations during the decision-making process in the run-up to American military involvement in the Vietnam War.[15] In theory, by taking direct action loudly and publicly, the military could prevent civilians from being wrong. However, this would violate a central principle advocated by civilian supremacists because in their view, civilians have ultimate control over the use of the military and subsequent policy they, “have a right to be wrong.”[16] As Feaver puts it, “the military can describe in some detail the nature of the threat posed by a particular enemy, but only the civilian can decide whether to feel threatened and so how or even whether to respond. The military quantifies the risk, the civilian judges it.”[17] Therefore, from civilian supremacists’ perspective, fostering a civilian led relationship hinges on acknowledging the necessity for military expertise in tactical matters while upholding the civilian prerogative to make ultimate strategic decisions, even when they may be contentious or erroneous.
The extent to what the military professional does when there is contention is where there is a divide (at least in the military). As former Marine Andrew Milburn argues, “when the military professional alone is in a position to prevent calamity, it makes little sense to argue that he should not exercise his discretion.”[18] However, if that discretion does not work in changing the mind of civilians or prevent them from what they view as “wrong,” then “McMasterism” is the next logical step. In this case, Halleck didn't have to take this step; merely the threat of “McMasterism” was enough to deter President Lincoln. While "McMasterism" is closely associated with the study of American civil-military relations post-Cold War, Halleck’s actions suggest that this sentiment has deeper roots in American history than scholars typically acknowledge.
Brooks further adds in her evaluation of this phenomenon concluded that; “If a military leader resigns in opposition to an imminent decision by a president or policymaker and that action mobilizes public opposition, the costs to the civilian leadership of pursuing that action increase.”[19] There are clear delineations between general officers being fired and resigning over policy disagreements or other issues. The firing of a general officer implies a loss of confidence in military leadership from the civilian leadership. The resignation of a general officer implies a loss of confidence in the civilian leadership. The effect of either action depends on the popularity of the general or civilian leader, the perception by the public and other civilian leaders, and the impact of the policy they are disagreeing over.
Halleck continued to survive as General-in-Chief, but his role did change when U.S. Grant assumed his position and Halleck was appointed to be his chief of staff. But his passiveness and clashes with the President and Secretary of War had earned him a demotion. The president remarked at one point that Halleck was, “little more . . . than a first-rate clerk.”[20] That largely became his role as the intensity of fighting increased dramatically in 1864 requiring more supplies and men than ever before.[21] Halleck would continually clash with Grant over strategy, but he had already been supplanted and his influence deteriorated in the final months of the war. Both Lincoln's decision to keep Halleck and his respective decision to retain his position even after his demotion are important to note. Lincoln had undermined the Huntington principle of objective control by interfering (or what Halleck believed as interfering) directly in military operations but was the president wrong for his frustration about the lack of aggressiveness and results by the army? Was it wrong for Halleck to be frustrated by the intrusion of civilians into military operations? There isn’t a direct answer for either but shows how relationships and personalities are the primary driver of civil-military relations.
Halleck’s legacy is incredibly checkered. Even now, there is an army of historians ready to assail his faults and shortcomings. Historians Williamson Murray and Wayne Wei-Sheng asserted that he was, “A pedant, enveloped in a warped understanding of Jomini and what Halleck believed was proper military theory.”[22] This led him to be overly cautious and came close to “single-handedly wrecking the Union War effort” because he clashed with Grant.[23] Even still, he kept Grant and Sherman around when they were facing their shortcomings early in the war, if those two had resigned or been fired, the outcome of the war might have been entirely different.[24]
Henry Halleck is a figure both decisive and polarizing. While often overshadowed by more prominent figures like Grant and Sherman, Halleck's role in shaping military policy and advising President Lincoln during the Civil War was pivotal. His cautious approach and administrative focus sometimes clashed with the more aggressive strategies favored by his contemporaries, leading to tensions that highlight the enduring challenges in civil-military relations. Halleck's offer to resign in protest over a strategic disagreement with Lincoln shows the delicate balance between military expertise and civilian authority—a balance that remains a central issue in contemporary military discourse. Despite his flaws and the criticisms levied against him, Halleck's actions and decisions during the war had a lasting impact, reminding of the interplay between military leaders and civilian policymakers in times of national crisis. His story serves as a historical precursor to modern debates on the role of military officers in advising and sometimes challenging civilian leadership, illustrating the complexities and nuances that define effective civil-military collaboration.
References
Brooks, Risa. 2020. "Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil Military Relations in the United States." International Security 7-44.
Calhoun, Mark T. 2011. "CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI: Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory." Army History 22-37.
Donald, David Herbert. 1995. Lincoln. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Feaver, Peter. 1996. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." Armed Forces & Society 149-170.
Feaver, Peter. 2007. "The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision." International Secuirty 87-125.
Marszalek, John F. 2004. Commander of All Lincoln’s Armies: A Life of General Henry W. Halleck. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
Mesch, Allen H. 2019. Preparing for Disunion: West Point Commandants and the Training of Civil War Leaders. Jefferson: McFarland & Company.
Milburn, Andrew. 2010. "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional." Joint Forces Quarterly 101-107.
Payne, Andrew. 2023. "Bargaining with the Military: How President Manage the Political Costs of Civilian Control." International Security 166-207.
Smith, Jean Edward. 2001. Grant. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Williamson Murray, Wayne Wei-siang. 2018. A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[1] Mark T. Calhoun, "CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI: Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory." Army History, (2011): 23.
[2] Calhoun, 31.
[3] Allen Mesch, Preparing for Disunion: West Point Commandants and the Training of Civil War Leaders, (West Jefferson: McFarland, 2018), 23-24.
[4] John F. Marszalek, Commander of All Lincoln’s Armies: A Life of General Henry W. Halleck (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004), 129.
[5] Jean Edward Smith, Grant (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 287.
[6] Andrew Payne, "Bargaining with the Military: How President Manage the Political Costs of Civilian Control." International Security (2023): 166.
[7] Henery Halleck quoted by David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 410.
[8] Lincoln quoted by Herbert, 410.
[9] Herbert, 410.
[10] Marszalek, 164.
[11] Risa Brooks, "Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil Military Relations in the United States." International Security, (2020): 17.
[12] Brooks, 18.
[13] Peter Feaver, "The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision." International Security, (2007): 94.
[14] Feaver, "The Right to be Right," 94-95.
[15] Feaver, "The Right to Be Right," 94.
[16] Peter Feaver. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." Armed Forces & Society (1996): 154.
[17] Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 154.
[18] Andrew Milburn. "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional." Joint Forces Quarterly (2010): 105.
[19] Brooks, 19.
[20] Abraham Lincoln quoted by Marszalek, 202.
[21] Marszalek, 204.
[22] Williamson Murray and Wayne Wei-Siang, A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 543
[23] Murray and Wei-Siang, 543.
[24] Marszalek, 201.
I thought a significant point made by McMasters was the degree to which LBJ lied to and pushed aside the Joint Chiefs, ergo the dereliction of duty was not limited to those in uniform but was embraced by the President and his civilian advisers who knew better but carried on for political reasons rather than as a matter of strategy. I’ve actually got a copy of Halleck’s book on strategy and mean to read it but it took me five attempts to get through Jomini!